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Can Residential Mobility 
Programs Improve Human Capital? 
Comparing Social Mechanisms 
in Two Different Programs
James E. Rosenbaum
Northwestern University
Underlying some arguments for residential mobility is an implicit 
assumption that low-income individuals’ capabilities can be improved 
by residential moves. We can conceive of four kinds of social influences 
by which residential moves might improve individuals’ human capital: 
1) schools, 2) labor markets, 3) informal social interaction, and 4) safe-
ty. Each of these mechanisms might have a different kind of influence 
on the value of individuals’ human capital. 
First, and most simply, school quality varies across different loca-
tions in the United States. Affluent neighborhoods have schools with 
better-paid teachers, more resources, and higher achievement test 
scores. If residential mobility moves low-income families from areas 
with poor schools to areas with much better schools, children’s human 
capital can increase because of better instruction and higher standards. 
Second, residential mobility can move low-income families from 
labor markets with weak demand for their labor to labor markets with 
stronger demand for their labor—in other words, places offering semi-
skilled jobs. Even adults with modest skills will see the value of their 
human capital increase. For instance, if suburban employers have more 
difficulty than urban employers in finding individuals to take semi-
skilled jobs (e.g., as sales clerks, service workers, etc.), then individu-
als seeking such jobs will have much better employment prospects (and 
perhaps better wages) if they move from urban to suburban locations. 
Third, residential mobility can move participants to areas where 
informal social interaction (social capital) supports employment and 
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school effort. For children, moving away from schools and friends that 
discourage school effort and into areas that encourage school effort may 
improve their academic performance. For adults, moving to neighbor-
hoods where they make new friends who strongly encourage employ-
ment may make them more motivated to work, which may increase 
their human capital.
Fourth, residential mobility can move families to safer areas, and 
adults’ and children’s human capital will be less impaired by anxiety 
and depression. Research has shown the debilitating effects of violent 
neighborhoods (Garbarino 1995), so moves away from such neighbor-
hoods may reduce these influences.
Obviously, each mechanism is complex, and marshaling evidence 
on any one of these would be a large endeavor, beyond the scope and 
purpose of this chapter. Here, I merely propose these four mechanisms 
as a means of understanding the possible ways in which residential 
mobility programs might affect human capital. I use this concept to 
examine whether these social influences are altered by two different 
residential mobility programs.
This chapter seeks to identify dimensions on which these two resi-
dential mobility programs differ, to describe the neighborhood place-
ments and social influences created by these programs, and to consid-
er how these social influences might explain individual outcomes. In 
contrast with literature that focuses on mobility’s effects on individual 
outcomes, this review focuses on program procedures, program place-
ments, and the social influences that participants encounter. Although I 
also present empirical findings on individual outcomes, I am less con-
cerned about inferring the average causal relationship between mobility 
and outcome behavior than in considering variations in the kinds of 
mobility procedures and their implications for creating a wide spec-
trum of different placements and social influences, which are the crucial 
forces that affect outcomes. In effect, I am proposing a model in which 
outcomes are a direct byproduct of social influences, which mediates 
“mobility effects.” The key unanswered question is not the relation-
ship between mobility and outcomes, but rather, what kinds of social 
influences do residential mobility program procedures create? Once we 
know what social influences are created, we will better understand what 
behavioral outcomes result.
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The chapter begins by describing two residential mobility programs, 
Moving to Opportunity for Fair Housing (MTO) and the Gautreaux 
Assisted Housing Program (Gautreaux). I then describe procedures 
in the two programs that influence placements. The next two sections 
describe the kinds of neighborhood placements and the social influenc-
es created by each program. I find that the programs differ in the kinds 
of placements and in three aspects of social influences (whether par-
ticipants attend good schools, change labor markets, or change social 
interactions), but are similar in improving perceived safety. I examine 
the specific procedures used by these two programs and consider how 
these procedures might influence the kinds of placements and social 
influences created by the two programs. I suggest that residential abil-
ity programs can alter human capital through these mechanisms, but 
that they must include program procedures that have a strong impact on 
improving social influences. 
PLACES MATTER—SOMETIMES 
Spatial mismatch has long been noted (Holzer 1991). Big differ-
ences have been shown in the resources and opportunities available in 
different locations (Briggs 2005). Some analyses contend that negative 
influences in neighborhoods with concentrated poverty may undermine 
the benefits of job and education programs (Wilson 1996).
Such observations have led to suggestions that residential mobility 
programs might provide more effective solutions. This is a profound 
contention—it suggests that mobility might increase human capital.
However, all moves don’t have the same impact. Having observed 
enormous differences in the quality of public schools between affluent 
suburbs and inner-city neighborhoods, affluent families choose to buy 
homes based on the quality of the public schools. Can residential mobil-
ity programs serving low-income families have the same impact?
This chapter shows that two residential mobility programs with 
similar goals lead to placements in very different neighborhoods, which 
produce different social influences—which in turn may have implica-
tions for participants. The questions of which moves have an impact 
and how they do so are of great policy importance. 
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PROGRAM DESIGN OF TWO RESIDENTIAL  
MOBILITY PROGRAMS
Gautreaux was a court-ordered demonstration program in Chicago, 
removed from the political process and conducted with low visibility. 
As a result of a consent decree, between 1976 and 1998, Gautreaux 
placed low-income black families who lived in housing projects (or 
were on the waiting list) into certain units in mostly white middle-
income suburbs or in low-income mostly black urban neighborhoods. A 
few hundred families moved each year, and only a few families moved 
into any single neighborhood. Because of this, the program had low vis-
ibility, although 7,000 families ultimately moved through the program, 
about half of whom moved to white middle-income suburbs (Polikoff 
2006). 
Gautreaux was not designed as a research study; few premove mea-
sures were collected, and families were not randomly assigned to sub-
urbs or city. However, assignments to the two conditions created a qua-
si-experimental design. According to reports in the 1980s by housing 
counselors implementing the program, families were assigned to one of 
the two conditions on a first-come, first-served basis. Although clients 
could refuse an offer, only 5 percent did so since they were unlikely to 
get another in the six months of their program eligibility (Rubinowitz 
and Rosenbaum 2000). As a result, placements approximated random 
assignment, but they were not perfectly random.
Suburb and city participants, on average, were highly similar before 
the move in personal attributes (age, number of children, education, 
marital status, public aid, years in program, etc.), but a few differences 
were noted in premove neighborhoods. While suburban movers came 
from slightly lower poverty tracts than city movers (a poverty rate of 
40.6 percent versus 43.8 percent), they moved to census tracts with dra-
matically lower poverty rates (5.0 percent versus 27.3 percent [DeLuca 
and Rosenbaum 2003]). Although it is possible that preexisting differ-
ences may affect outcomes, there are reasons to think this impact is 
relatively small. First, it seems reasonable to infer that the large out-
come differences are probably explained less by the 3-percentage-point 
difference in initial neighborhoods than by the 22-percentage-point 
difference in placements. Second, multivariate analyses that control 
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for baseline attributes and locations found large, significant impacts of 
placement neighborhood attributes on outcomes an average of 14 years 
after program placement (DeLuca and Rosenbaum 2003; Keels et al. 
2005).
The MTO program was modeled on the Gautreaux program, but 
MTO was a random assignment experiment. Eligible families were 
placed in treatments by random assignment, and analysis considered 
all families who received offers (regardless of whether they moved or 
not). This allowed researchers to assess the impact of being given the 
chance to move compared to what similar people did in the absence of 
this opportunity.
MTO departed from the Gautreaux program design in several 
respects besides random assignment. First, whereas Gautreaux placed 
families in specific units, MTO specified census tracts and let families 
choose any housing unit in any neighborhood, as long as it was located 
in a qualifying tract. MTO designers may have felt that further con-
straints beyond census tract were unnecessary or not politically desir-
able. Although some counselors found units for families (much like the 
Gautreaux housing staff), that was not common, so most families were 
on their own to find units. Counseling practices were not specified in 
the program design. It is not clear what MTO counselors told families 
about neighborhoods, but some reports suggest that some counselors 
encouraged addresses where participants would find neighbors similar 
to themselves. 
Second, while Gautreaux moved experimental group families to 
distant suburbs, MTO focused on specifying census tract poverty con-
centration, and it permitted any kind of move, including moves within 
the city. The emphasis in MTO was on meeting the tract poverty-rate 
goal quickly and efficiently.
Third, while Gautreaux was a racial integration program that moved 
experimental-group families into mostly white suburbs, all of which 
were low-poverty, MTO gave no consideration to tract racial composi-
tion, and many MTO program movers chose residences that met the 
poverty requirements but were located in mostly black neighborhoods 
(Orr et al. 2003). 
The two programs also had somewhat different entrance rules. All 
MTO participants and most Gautreaux participants were housing proj-
ect residents, but some Gautreaux participants were on the housing 
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project wait list. While wait list families were not in housing project 
circumstances, their housing circumstances were no better than those of 
housing project residents, and perhaps they were worse—the families 
were either in crowded conditions, constantly moving, on the verge of 
eviction, or in homeless shelters (Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum 2000). 
The fact that they desired to enter Chicago public housing, despite its 
well-known dangers, suggests that they considered their living condi-
tions worse than the housing projects.
In terms of education and welfare receipt, two important population 
characteristics, there are small differences between the programs. While 
similar portions of household heads had completed high school or got-
ten a GED in MTO and Gautreaux (60.3 to 63.9 percent), more MTO 
families were on public aid than in Gautreaux (61 versus 50 percent 
[Orr et al. 2003, Table C-2; Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum 2000, p. 79]). 
Participants in the two programs were probably not greatly different.
PLACEMENTS IN THE TWO PROGRAMS
In both programs, families in the experimental group were intend-
ed to be placed into a different type of neighborhood than the control 
group. I describe the kinds of neighborhoods into which the experi-
mental groups of each program were actually placed. I look at three 
aspects of neighborhoods: census tract, microneighborhood, and dis-
tance from baseline neighborhood. I find that the programs differ on all 
three. Results are summarized in Table 8.1.
Census Tracts
Although both programs aimed to move families to less-poor neigh-
borhoods, the programs led participants to neighborhoods with differ-
ent compositions of poverty and race. Gautreaux’s suburban placements 
were all in low-poverty census tracts. Indeed, based on an analysis of 
a 50 percent random sample of Gautreaux movers between 1976 and 
1990 using administrative data, the 743 suburban movers were placed in 
census tracts where the average percentage of poverty was 5.3 (DeLuca 
and Rosenbaum 2003, p. 323). Moreover, most neighbors were afflu-
Can Residential Mobility Programs Improve Human Capital?   131
Table 8.1  Program Design Elements for MTO and Gautreaux Movers 
(all numbers in %)
MTO Gautreauxa
Moving distance
Moves less than 10 miles 84 10
Neighborhood placements  
(census tract attributes)
Placements’ average percent poverty 12.4 5.3
Placement in over 40% black areas 38 5
Microneighborhoods
Procedures to prevent enclaves? no yes
Created enclaves? yes? no
Social contexts
Schools
School district change? 30 ~100
Schools w/above-average test scores 10 88
Labor markets
Change labor market? no? yes?
Labor market comparison strong→strong weak→strong
Social interactions
Contact with former peers? often? rare?
Safety improved yes yes
Duration






NOTE: ? indicates best estimate from qualitative or administrative data; the rest is 
based on systematic evidence. 
a These figures include the families who relocated to suburban communities outside of 
the city of Chicago. See DeLuca and Rosenbaum (2003) for a more detailed analysis 
of all Gautreaux program moves. 
b For MTO, this means that the neighborhood at the follow-up survey was less than 10 
percent poor; for Gautreaux, it means that the neighborhoods at last follow-up were 
less than 30 percent African American. Note, however, that Gautreaux has a much 
longer follow-up period (see Orr et al., p. 33).
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ent; the mean family income in the suburban census tracts was $71,545 
(ibid., p. 323). The suburban locations were required to be less than 30 
percent black, and almost all (90 percent) placement tracts were less 
than 16 percent black (ibid., p. 325). Overall, the average placement 
tract had no more than 10 percent black households (ibid.). 
In contrast, MTO placements did not consider racial composition. 
Although it was hoped that the program would increase racial integra-
tion, it was not required, and the results indicate that it often did not 
happen. In 1997, not long after the move, about 38 percent of experi-
mental group movers were living in highly black areas (over 40 percent 
black [Goering and Feins 2003]), while less than 5 percent of Gau-
treaux’s suburban movers’ placements were in such areas (DeLuca and 
Rosenbaum 2003). 
MTO appeared to accomplish its goals in terms of 1990 census fig-
ures, but some of these figures failed to capture the reality of chang-
ing census tract composition, and MTO ultimately fell short because 
of this. Nearly all movers (94 percent) went to areas with less than 11 
percent poverty, based on the 1990 census data available at the time 
of placement (Orr et al. 2003, p. 29). However, because of changes in 
tract composition after 1990, the actual composition of census tracts at 
the time of the move averaged 12.4 percent. Based on the 2000 census 
data, the program estimated that “just half of the moves were to areas 
estimated to have poverty rates below 10 percent at the time of the 
move, and another third were to areas of 10 to 15 percent poverty at 
the time. All told, 97 percent moved to areas with less than 20 percent 
poverty” (ibid., p.30). While moving participants from tracts with over 
40 percent poverty to tracts with less than 20 percent poverty is a big 
improvement, these neighborhoods may have had different characteris-
tics than the intended 10 percent goal. Both programs moved one group 
to low-poverty census tracts, but the programs led to different kinds of 
neighborhoods. 
Microneighborhoods
Beyond that, the programs led to different microneighborhoods 
as well. Gautreaux placed families in specific apartments. Real-estate 
staff located units that avoided enclaves, and counselors made sure to 
avoid creating enclaves. No more than three families were placed in 
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any neighborhood, and neighborhoods were avoided if many African 
American families already lived there (Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum 
2000). The program also avoided areas located near concentrations of 
black or low-income families (ibid.). 
In contrast, MTO defined neighborhoods only in terms of census 
tracts, and did not consider microneighborhoods within census tracts. 
MTO had no rules or procedures to avoid enclaves within census tracts, 
and some counselors thought that enclaves were desirable because they 
provided social support. MTO families chose their own housing units, 
choices that were presumably based on their preferences, housing avail-
ability, and landlord willingness. Unlike Gautreaux, where real-estate 
staff convinced reluctant landlords to take participants, the MTO pro-
gram did not provide such opportunities. Consequently, in MTO, par-
ticipant choices influenced microneighborhoods.
Did MTO move families into enclaves? Casual observation of maps 
of MTO placements raises concerns. While experimental group place-
ments in Gautreaux are widely scattered (as depicted on a map on a wall 
at the Leadership Council), some placements in MTO indicate more 
than three families placed close together. Some placements are locat-
ed on census-tract boundaries adjoining higher-poverty census tracts 
(Goering et al. 1999), a finding similar to observations of another hous-
ing voucher program (Cronin and Rasmussen 1981). Although we do 
not have geo-coded data on MTO placements, it is possible to generate 
such geo-codes, and research could be done to compare the programs 
on whether microneighborhoods allowed concentration. If enclaves are 
created, one must wonder whether and how they may insulate families 
from the potential benefits of low-poverty census tracts.
Distance from Prior Neighborhoods 
Part of the social impact of these programs may be in removing 
participants from the influence of old neighborhoods. If “prior neigh-
borhoods seem to be magnets” (Briggs 1997), and if the power of mag-
nets declines with distance, moving distance may influence whether old 
neighbors continue to influence families. The experimental group in the 
two programs experienced quite different moves in this respect.
For Gautreaux movers, the average suburban placement was 25 
miles (Keels et al. 2005), and fewer than 10 percent of moves were less 
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than ten miles.1 In contrast, 84 percent of MTO experimental group 
moves were less than ten miles from the baseline address, and some 
participants moved less than one mile (Kling et al. 2004, Table A14). 
These differences raise concerns about whether families actually left 
their old neighborhood. While the difficulty of traveling ten miles may 
differ according to public transit routes, we suspect that more par-
ticipants will continue interactions with old friends from one to ten 
miles away than will do so with ones 25 miles away, and they may 
continue to be influenced by peer pressures from their former high- 
poverty neighborhoods.
In summary, program design elements of Gautreaux and MTO 
appear to have created moves to very different types of neighborhoods 
(based on poverty and racial characteristics), different microneighbor-
hood influences, and different distances from initial residences. 
SOCIAL INFLUENCES IN THE TWO PROGRAMS 
Having seen the actual placements, we might expect that the two 
programs would create different social influences. New neighborhoods 
present different institutions and conditions that offer the possibility 
of new influences. These “social influences” refer to broad conditions 
offered within neighborhoods, not individual outcomes. This section 
considers four kinds of influences relevant to neighborhoods: 1) schools, 
2) local labor markets, 3) social interaction, and 4) safety.
1)  Schools: Did Residential Mobility Change Schools and  
 School Quality? 
One of the most striking aspects of American public education is 
the way schools vary by geography. Within a large metropolitan area, 
schools often vary enormously in quality between affluent suburban 
areas and less affluent urban areas. In part, this is due to local funding 
differences and to differential ways that funding is spent (i.e., wheth-
er school funds are spent on curricula and instruction or on security 
and building maintenance [Jencks and Phillips 1998]). If low-income 
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minority families moved to better neighborhoods, we might expect that 
they would attend better schools. 
In Gautreaux, nearly all families moving to suburbs changed school 
districts and began attending different schools (Rubinowitz and Rosen-
baum 2000). They generally attended much better schools than they had 
in the city. Indeed, 88 percent of Gautreaux suburban movers attended 
schools where the average test scores were in the top half of national 
standards (Orr et al. 2003; Rosenbaum et al. 1993).
In contrast, while the MTO experimental group changed neigh-
borhoods, they rarely changed school districts. Seventy percent of the 
MTO treatment group movers stayed in the same school district (Orr 
et al. 2003). Overall, the average experimental-group child was in a 
school in the twenty-first percentile, and less than 10 percent attended 
schools that ranked above the fiftieth percentile (ibid., pp. 110–111). 
In summary, the two residential mobility programs led children to 
very different sets of schools. Research is clearly needed to understand 
why there was so little school improvement for MTO movers. Perhaps 
the short moves explain part of this school difference. Research has 
begun to examine how parents make these choices (see Briggs et al. 
2006). 
2)  Labor Market: Did Moving to a Different Labor Market Mean 
Moving to a Stronger Labor Market? 
One of the most intriguing possibilities suggested by mobility pro-
grams is that residential mobility might directly increase the value of 
the movers’ human capital. Individuals with low-level skills and limited 
education may have little market value in high poverty neighborhoods, 
where many people have the same qualifications and available jobs are 
quickly filled. If these individuals move to distant affluent suburbs, 
where the demand for low-skilled workers exceeds the supply, these 
individuals will be in greater demand and perhaps have greater value. 
Gautreaux occurred during the 1980s, when employment opportu-
nities in the suburbs were strong, while they were weak in inner-city 
areas. The spatial mismatch theory posits that the distance between 
available unskilled jobs (in the suburbs) and available semiskilled 
workers (in the city) contributes to unemployment of semiskilled work-
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ers (Holzer 1991). These distances often require long commutes, which 
are particularly onerous given poor public transportation, and the low 
pay of these jobs is not sufficient to justify the high costs of commutes 
in time and money. 
Given the well-documented spatial mismatch between suburban 
labor markets and city residents, the Gautreaux program made exactly 
the kinds of moves that were likely to put semiskilled adults into labor 
markets with strong demand and few competitors. In contrast, as noted, 
the MTO treatment group made short-distance moves, so it isn’t clear 
whether those workers actually moved to a “different labor market.” 
In addition, there are indications that the MTO program treat-
ment group was already in strong labor markets prior to moving. MTO 
occurred in the late 1990s, during a strong economy, when labor market 
demand for semiskilled workers was very high. In addition, at the same 
time, the TANF program of welfare reform had pushed large numbers 
of families off public assistance and into jobs. As a result, the labor mar-
kets in low-income neighborhoods improved for everyone. The treat-
ment group moved out of strong labor markets that would likely have 
improved their prospects if they had stayed.
3)  Social Interaction: How Much Did Families Really Leave Prior 
Neighborhoods Behind? 
Third, residential mobility can move participants to areas where 
informal social interaction (social capital) supports employment and 
school effort. For children, moving away from schools and friends that 
don’t encourage school effort and into areas where social norms support 
school effort may improve those students’ own school efforts. If adults 
move to neighborhoods where they make new friends who strongly 
encourage employment, they may be more motivated to work, which 
may increase the value of their human capital. Obviously, these social 
influences on mothers and children are complex and require detailed 
analyses (see Rosenbaum, DeLuca, and Tuck 2005).2 However, all of 
them are premised on the assumption that mothers and children stop 
interacting with their former friends, which may not be true.
Residential mobility studies implicitly assume that residential 
changes influence social interaction. Mothers and children whose 
homes are in new neighborhoods will have new neighbors and institu-
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tions with which to interact. Thus it is important to consider whether 
families maintain their ties with individuals and institutions in the old 
neighborhood. 
In interviews, Gautreaux suburban movers reported that weekday 
visits to their former neighborhoods were very rare (Rubinowitz and 
Rosenbaum 2000). With average suburban moves of 25 miles, moth-
ers and children could not easily travel back to the old neighborhood 
on a daily basis. Some suburban movers returned to the old neighbor-
hood for occasional weekend visits with relatives or to go to church; 
these Sunday visits were often to family dinners and churches, and they 
occurred in the daytime, not at night (ibid.). While it was theoretically 
possible for some children to continue attending their old schools (if 
they pretended to live with a relative), this almost never happened, and 
the few times it did was for summer school (ibid.). Thus, children’s 
contacts with old neighbors were limited to occasional visits and mostly 
in the presence of adults. 
While these rare visits had the downside of causing initial feelings 
of isolation, this may have increased the impact of the move. At the 
time of the second interview, over seven years after moving, very few 
mothers or children were socially isolated. Most of the children inter-
acted with white classmates after school, often in each other’s homes 
(Rosenbaum et al. 1993, p. 1538).
In contrast, the MTO short moves probably made it easier to main-
tain old support networks. Research suggests that many children con-
tinued to interact with friends from the old neighborhood. The interim 
report finds that the experimental-group movers were less likely to visit 
with friends from old neighborhoods (or to still be living there) com-
pared to the control group. However, 43 percent of experimental-group 
children still visited their friends from the old neighborhood, and the 
rate was somewhat higher for boys. 
These children moved to residences out of their old neighborhoods, 
but they may not have left the old neighborhood socially. It is important 
to note here that we do not know what children are doing when they 
visit friends in the old neighborhood, how often these visits happen, or 
how much these visits reduce exposure to the new neighborhood. 
Despite changing residence, many MTO experimental-group fami-
lies spent part of their social lives in their old neighborhoods and pre-
sumably were influenced by their former neighbors. It is important to 
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further explore both the reasons for and the implications of social inter-
action with the old neighborhood. While this may have been comfort-
ing, it altered the social influences of “moving.” 
4)  Safety: Did Moving to a New Neighborhood Make Families 
Feel Safer? 
Given the higher incidence of crime and assaults in low-income 
neighborhoods, it is generally expected that moves to low-poverty 
neighborhoods would lead to less exposure to crime and greater feel-
ings of safety. In the Gautreaux program, suburban movers reported 
feeling much safer than city movers, and also much safer than they had 
themselves felt when they lived in the city. For instance, only 31 per-
cent of suburban movers said the suburban area was dangerous at night, 
while 71 percent of city movers said their neighborhood was dangerous 
at night (Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum 2000, p. 94).
Similarly, MTO families reported large increases in feelings of 
safety. In 2001, compared to the control group, the MTO experimental 
group was much more likely to feel safe at night (85 percent versus 55 
percent), much less likely to have been victimized in the last six months 
(12 percent versus 21 percent), and much less likely to be dissatisfied 
with the police (77 percent versus 48 percent) [Orr et al. 2003, Table 
3.5]. These moves did have an effect on perceptions of safety. These 
changes are likely linked to the big improvements in mental health not-
ed below. 
In summary, these findings indicate that moves in both programs 
led to improved neighborhood influences. However, some evidence 
suggests that moves in Gautreaux were accompanied by greater expo-
sure to low-poverty neighborhoods and more social separation from the 
old neighborhood than the MTO moves. Future research would benefit 
from understanding the issues of social exposure to new and old neigh-
borhoods and the positive and negative aspects of each.
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INFLUENCES ON INDIVIDUAL OUTCOMES:  
EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT, SUBSEQUENT MOVES,  
AND MENTAL HEALTH
Do residential moves affect individuals’ outcomes? The follow-
ing sections examine the effects of the two programs on four differ-
ent outcomes theorized to be related to neighborhoods: 1) education, 
2) employment, 3) subsequent moves, and 4) mental health.
1)  Education—Can Moves Improve School Outcomes without 
Improved Schools?
The Gautreaux studies found dramatic differences between the sub-
urban and city groups in educational outcomes. Compared to children 
who moved within the city, suburban movers were more likely to com-
plete a high school diploma, to be on a college track in high school, to 
attend college, and to attend a four-year college. These were statistically 
significant and large differences (Rosenbaum 1995). In contrast, MTO 
has not had enough time to see such long-term effects; however, four to 
seven years after random assignment, children in the MTO experimen-
tal group did not perform better than control-group children on reading 
and math achievement tests, or in terms of suspensions, expulsions, and 
school engagement (Kling et al. 2004).
Although MTO’s superior research design may explain the different 
findings, alternative explanations are possible. As noted, MTO moves 
rarely resulted in students changing school districts or attending above-
average schools, and sometimes resulted in no change of schools. 
In contrast, nearly all suburban movers in Gautreaux moved to new 
school districts, many of which were dramatically better than those for 
the control group (whose members moved within the city). Given the 
radical disparities in school quality in different locations, many hoped 
residential mobility would provide access to good schools. As noted, 
less than 10 percent of the MTO experimental group attended schools 
with above-average achievement test scores, while 88 percent of Gau-
treaux experimental-group students did so. MTO’s findings may indi-
cate that residential mobility without better schools has little impact on 
educational outcomes (particularly if children keep interacting with old 
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friends). Merely improving the composition of neighbors (in a census 
tract) does not by itself improve children’s educational achievement. 
This raises an important policy implication: policymakers need to 
think carefully about how school choices are incorporated into neigh-
borhood choices. Middle-class families often choose neighborhoods 
based on school quality, but many MTO families ignored school qual-
ity, and the program provided no information or advice about school 
quality. It is likely that without moving children to areas with above-
average schools, there will be no discernible education effects.
2) Employment—Moves to Different or Stronger Labor Markets 
Do moves put people in different labor markets? 
A second focus of research was on adult employment. The early 
Gautreaux survey research showed that mothers’ employment was sig-
nificantly higher in the suburbs, but that mothers’ earnings and hours 
worked were no different. Later analyses, using administrative data 
from a much larger random sample, suggest that the primary influ-
ence was neighborhood composition, not the city/suburb distinction 
(DeLuca and Rosenbaum 2003; Mendenhall, DeLuca, and Duncan 
2006; Rosenbaum, DeLuca, and Miller 1999). Research found that 
while the city/suburb distinction did not have a significant effect on 
public-aid receipt, “public-aid rates went from 26 percent to 39 percent 
for families placed in the highest and lowest quintile neighborhoods, 
with respect to education level of the tract. . . . The difference remains 
very strong and significant even after controlling for years in the pro-
gram, age, and premove public aid” (DeLuca and Rosenbaum 2003, 
p. 312). Similar findings with more extensive controls (and a different 
distinction, one based on race and poverty, not education) were found 
for employment outcomes and public aid (Mendenhall, DeLuca, and 
Duncan 2006). 
Employment was also a major focus of the MTO research. The 
main finding was summarized in a subheading of the executive sum-
mary of the interim impacts evaluation: compared to the control group 
there were “no effects on employment or earnings” (Orr 2003, p. xiii). 
However, there are two questions that arise. 
The first is whether MTO actually moves families to different labor 
markets. Unlike Gautreaux, where 25-mile moves from declining inner-
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city neighborhoods to high-growth suburbs clearly put families in dif-
ferent labor markets, MTO’s less-than-10-mile moves (often within city 
limits) may not have put them in a different labor market, and it may not 
have even reduced commuting time.
Did MTO move people from strong labor markets? 
The second question is whether MTO moved families from strong 
labor markets to (other) strong labor markets. While the Gautreaux pro-
gram moved families from weak to strong labor markets (Rosenbaum 
et al. 1993), MTO moved families who were already in strong labor 
markets. MTO occurred during a strong economy, when labor mar-
ket demand for semiskilled workers was very high. MTO results were 
measured between 1994 and 2000, when an unusually strong economy, 
strong welfare reform policy (TANF), and expanded earned income tax 
credit encouraged many poor people to work (Blank 2002). As a result, 
the labor markets in low-income neighborhoods improved, leading to 
less difference in labor market influences between MTO experimental 
and control group families.
The strength of premove labor markets is seen in the control group. 
The control group’s employment gains were extraordinary—100 per-
cent gains. The MTO control group employment increased from 23.6 
to 50.9 percent (ibid, p. 127). One hundred percent gains are rare in 
experimental groups of powerful programs (Barnow 1987; Bassi and 
Ashenfelter 1986; Bloom et al. 1993; Cave and Doolittle 1991). Obvi-
ously, the premove labor market that the control group represented was 
a very strong labor market. Although the treatment group’s gains were 
no larger than the control group’s gains, both groups resided in very 
strong labor markets.
Indeed, in the context of such a strong labor market, one must won-
der whether those still unemployed might have serious physical or psy-
chological barriers to working—in other words, are there ceiling effects 
against further gains? Or are residential mobility effects effective for 
the same people who already benefited? One must also doubt that these 
findings would generalize to more ordinary historical periods. 
In summary, while Gautreaux families moved from weak to strong 
labor markets, it is not clear whether MTO families moved to different 
labor markets and, even if they did, it appears the experimental group 
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moved out of labor markets that were getting very strong—markets that 
led to 100 percent gains in employment for the control group. 
3)  Duration—Did Families Stay? 
One indication of whether families see benefits to their move is 
whether they choose to stay. In turn, duration may influence the impact 
of moves. To the extent that they return to low-income neighborhoods, 
we might infer that they got few benefits in their new locations. Con-
versely, short-duration moves are likely to have little impact.
Using administrative data, research located Gautreaux partici-
pants an average of 15 years after they had made their initial move 
in the program. Selecting a 50 percent random sample of all families 
who had moved between 1976 and 1990 (1,507 families), researchers 
located recent addresses of 1,504 of these 1,507 families (DeLuca and 
Rosenbaum 2003). The research found that about two-thirds of families 
placed in the suburbs still remained in mostly white suburbs an average 
of 15 years later. Further analyses of these data indicate that families 
“continued to reside in neighborhoods with income levels that matched 
those of their placement neighborhoods. . . . Families who were placed 
in low-crime and suburban locations were more likely to reside in low-
crime neighborhoods years later” (Keels et al. 2005, p. 51). 
In contrast, over a much shorter time interval (five years), MTO 
studies found that only 44.4 percent of the experimental-group mov-
ers still lived in low-poverty census tracts (15 percent poverty or less 
[Orr et al. 2003, pp. 30, 34]). In addition, a majority (59 percent) of 
the experimental-group movers were living in 80-percent-plus minor-
ity tracts (ibid., pp. 34, 37). As the interim report notes, many of these 
subsequent moves were “to areas more like the ones where the Section 
8 families and control group movers lived … [and] to high-minority 
neighborhoods” (ibid., p. 33, 37).
 Ironically, although the Gautreaux moves imposed more disruption 
on participants’ lives than did the MTO moves, the 15-year retention 
rate in Gautreaux was substantially higher than the shorter, five-year 
retention rate in MTO (66 percent versus 44 percent). Despite Gau-
treaux participants’ initial fears about these moves, their preferences 
changed. Families reported that, over time, they formed friendships 
with neighbors and their children also made friends and became part 
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of their schools and communities (Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum 2000). 
While children had initial difficulties in school, they gradually did bet-
ter. Ironically, after the program induced families to move to areas they 
might not have chosen otherwise, families came to appreciate the new 
neighborhoods.
In contrast, since MTO families didn’t move far, families may have 
continued interacting with their old friends, so they may not have made 
friends in their new neighborhoods. Although retaining old friends pre-
served social support and made the transition smoother, it also meant 
that the old neighborhood remained a social magnet (Briggs 1997) 
which often created a strong pull. 
4)  Mental Health—Do Moves Improve Families’ Outlooks? 
Gautreaux did not study health outcomes, but I include this topic 
because it is one of the most important discoveries of the MTO research, 
which found significant improvements in mental health.
Despite the many countervailing influences I have identified that 
might have reduced the impact of MTO moves, the MTO experimental 
group showed strong significant differences from the control group in 
terms of mothers’ and daughters’ perceptions of neighborhood safety, as 
well as psychological distress, depression, and obesity (Orr et al. 2003, 
p. 77). These findings are extremely impressive. The magnitude of dif-
ference is as great as one might see from programs devoted specifically 
to improving mental health (Kling et al. 2004). These are consistent 
differences, repeatedly found over time and in separate measures—not 
just statistical flukes.
CONCLUSION
MTO is a truly impressive study. It offers a carefully designed pro-
gram and a well-administered research design that provides the stron-
gest study in this area. Although MTO offers a stronger research design 
than Gautreaux, it offers a weaker program, leading to much weaker 
changes in social influences. MTO is useful for examining the impact 
of modest moves and modest changes in social influences.
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However, MTO is not a good test of whether residential mobility 
can have a strong impact. If we are interested in discovering the poten-
tial impact of residential mobility on individual outcomes, we must 
examine a program that creates bigger changes in social influences. I 
have identified specific procedures that may contribute to those kinds 
of placements and social influences. 
While the MTO studies provide stronger research evidence, the 
Gautreaux program creates larger changes in the environment. The two 
programs create different placements and different social influences, 
which are likely to explain some of the discrepancies in program out-
comes (see Table 8.1). 
Some observers have argued that the low-income families selected 
for the Gautreaux program would have moved to these kinds of neigh-
borhoods even without the program. MTO shows that this is a wrong 
assumption—most MTO families were comparable, but virtually no 
MTO families moved 25 miles to mostly white affluent neighborhoods 
on their own. Obviously, Gautreaux-type moves would not have hap-
pened without the strong program requirement and assistance provided 
by Gautreaux. Program design has a crucial impact on what kinds of 
moves happen.
This chapter has shown that similar programs can lead to dramati-
cally different placements and social influences, which are the key inter-
vening mechanisms influencing human capital. These might have been 
altered if programs had been run slightly differently. In other words, 
the devil is in the details. It would have been easy to move many fami-
lies into low-income enclaves, if the Gautreaux program had not been 
more committed to avoiding enclaves (at the block level). If Gautreaux 
had been less committed to expanding housing options into new areas, 
it would have easily focused on a few nearby suburbs. Reducing the 
distance of moves would have been more convenient for housing coun-
selors who took families to see available units. These minor changes 
in procedures would have met the conditions demanded by the consent 
decree, and they would have looked pretty good in terms of census tract 
poverty rates. Recognizing the possibility that slight modifications of 
Gautreaux might have led to much weaker social influences can help 
us think about ways to design residential programs that have stronger 
benefits.
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In examining whether a residential mobility program is designed in 
a way that could improve human capital, we have asked what kinds of 
moves and social influences it creates. If a program moves families but 
leaves 90 percent of students in below-average schools, do we really 
expect improved educational achievement? If the program moves fami-
lies only a few miles, do we expect that they have entered a different 
labor market, which will improve the value of their human capital? If 
children don’t move far enough to change friendships and interactions, 
will they retain old friends, former gang memberships, and prior activi-
ties and interests? 
I have identified specific procedures that may contribute to big 
changes in placements and social influences. One can easily conceive 
of MTO including one or more of these procedures, and, as a result, 
offering participants quite different placements and social influences. 
As we try to imagine what kinds of programs might create such social 
influences, we might consider minor modifications of MTO as realis-
tic possibilities that might have such impact. Below, I suggest some 
minor modifications and some hypotheses (HYP) about potential 
consequences.
HYP 1: MTO + identify and require units not in low-income enclaves 
→ higher human capital.
HYP 2: MTO + moves 20 miles from old address → less interaction 
with old friends. Higher human capital.
In Gautreaux, real estate staff located appropriate housing units that 
were not in enclaves, were in better neighborhoods, and many were 
quite distant. On their own, participants were unlikely to even know 
about these neighborhoods, and so it isn’t surprising that MTO partici-
pants did not find such units. Real-estate staff could potentially have 
had a strong beneficial impact on MTO.
Counseling advice can also make a difference. Although both pro-
grams had housing counselors, MTO counselors did not provide infor-
mation about school quality or labor market demand, nor did they pro-
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vide advice about why participants should base their choices on such 
information. Gautreaux counselors mentioned both factors to help 
participants see the advantages of the distant moves they were offer-
ing. Residential mobility programs should give some thought to using 
housing counseling about these issues. Housing counseling may have 
a strong influence on participants’ choices and could lead to better out-
comes, as posited below.
HYP 3: MTO + identify locations with above-average schools + advice 
on how to choose them → better schools. Higher human capital.
HYP 4: MTO + identify locations with better job opportunities (for par-
ticipants’ level of skills) + advice on how to choose them → better 
employment outcomes. Higher human capital.
On the latter point, it is noteworthy that in some two-year colleg-
es that provide occupational training, job placement counselors often 
advise their graduates to consider residential moves to improve their 
employment prospects (Rosenbaum, Deil-Amen, and Person 2006). 
These college advisers realize the practical barriers imposed by spa-
tial mismatch—their graduates who live in low-income neighborhoods 
often live very far from the areas of employment growth, and many job 
vacancies require one-to-two-hour commutes. Besides providing skills 
and training to their graduates, these colleges advise their graduates 
to consider residential moves. Since they advise residential moves of 
20–40 miles, we might expect that residential mobility programs may 
need to advise participants to go similar distances to get employment 
benefits.
As noted, children who make short moves may keep interacting 
with old friends and experience little change in social norms, social 
skills, or motivation. MTO studies have found that girls benefit from the 
move but boys often do not. Although such gender differences might 
arise from biology or early socialization—factors that programs can’t 
change—gender differences might also arise from present influences, 
i.e., parents’ different rules for boys and girls, which may mean that 
boys actually don’t experience changes of “social influences.” 
We suspect that boys and girls may differ in their “traveling radi-
us”—the distance they are allowed to travel to see friends after school. 
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If boys can travel greater distances than girls, then boys who moved 
only a few miles in MTO can frequently return to old neighborhoods. 
New residential neighborhoods may not change their social networks or 
social norms—boys may retain old friends, former gang memberships, 
and prior activities and interests. If so, we can hypothesize the follow-
ing modifications that would reduce gender differences and increase the 
benefits to boys.
HYP 5: MTO + moms prevent boys from returning to old neighborhood 
→ change social interactions and outcomes. Higher human capital. 
HYP 6: MTO + move 25 miles → boys can’t return easily, change social 
interactions and outcomes. Higher human capital. 
We now have evidence about the kinds of placements and social 
influences created by two different programs. This comparison suggests 
that small procedural details can make a big difference. Besides the two 
programs described here, many other programs have arisen over the 
past decade. Many have entailed minor changes (despite its name, Gau-
treaux II strongly resembles MTO), but some have required dramatic 
changes in placements and social influences. For instance, another pro-
gram created by a court decision, the Thompson decision in Baltimore, 
is being studied by Professor DeLuca at Johns Hopkins University, and 
it may provide new evidence about the issues raised here. 
As we have seen, residential mobility is not a single entity. The two 
cases described here show how similar programs lead to very differ-
ent placements and social influences. I have suggested that it is these 
intervening mechanisms that are likely to explain whether a residential 
mobility program improves the value of individuals’ human capital, 
and I have suggested some detailed procedures that might contribute to 
such improvement. I hope that future policy discussions consider these 
issues.
Notes
 1.  This latter number was a special calculation that Micere Keels computed and 
reported to me in a conversation on February 23, 2006.
 2. We studied only mothers, not fathers, because there were very few fathers in the 
program.
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